Shackle versus Savage: non-probabilistic alternatives to subjective probability theory in the 1950s by Carlo Zappia & Marcello Basili
    
Università degli Studi di Siena 







Shackle versus Savage: non-probabilistic alternatives to 
subjective probability theory in the 1950s 
 
  
       
 





   
 
 
 n. 452 -  Maggio  2005 
 
 















Abstract - G.L.S Shackle’s rejection of the probability tradition stemming from Knight's definition 
of uncertainty was a crucial episode in the development of modern decision theory. A  set of 
methodological statements characterizing Shackle’s stance, abandoned for long, especially after 
Savage’s Foundations, have been re-discovered and are at the basis of current non-expected utility 
theories, in particular of the non-additive probability approach to decision making. This paper 
examines the discussion between Shackle and his critics in the 1950s. Drawing on Shackle’s papers 
housed at Cambridge University Library as well as on printed matter, we show that some critics 
correctly understood two aspects of Shackle’s theory which are of the utmost importance in our 
view: the non-additive character of the theory and the possibility of interpreting Shackle’s 
ascendancy functions as a specific distortion of the weighting function of the decision maker. It is 
argued that Shackle neither completely understood criticisms nor appropriately developed 
suggestions put forward by scholars like Kenneth Arrow, Ward Edwards, Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen. Had he succeeded in doing so, we contend, his theory might have been a more satisfactory 
alternative to Savage’s theory than it actually was. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper deals with the intellectual environment in which Shackle’s theory of decision 
making was formulated and first discussed. The period considered ranges from 1949 to 1961. 
In 1949, in fact, Shackle published his first volume on decision theory, Expectations in 
Economics, where he proposed an approach intended to dispense with probability calculus. 
The great impact of Shackle’s idiosyncratic approach is testified to by Arrow’s (1951) 
survey of the state of contemporary decision theory. Arrow (1951, p. 404) identified three 
developments in the formalisation of the theory of choice that represented “dramatic breaks in 
continuity and have given hopes of a much clearer understanding of the problem.” There 
were, first, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiomatic treatment of choice in risk-taking 
situations (1947); second, Wald’s transformation of the theory of statistical inference into a 
“special form” of the problem of rational behaviour under uncertainty (1950), and, third, 
Shackle’s “new formulation of the whole problem of uncertain anticipations and actions based 
on them.” Arrow singled Shackle’s theory out as the single formalised one among the theories 
aiming to discard the probability framework in their description of behaviour under 
uncertainty - a goal shared by Knight and Keynes among others. 
In the following years Savage’s Foundations of Statistics (Savage 1954) started 
spreading its lasting influence and soon established itself as the new mainstream reference. 
However, Shackle’s theory continued to be widely discussed in major journals as the 
alternative to the then consolidating mainstream. The theoretical economists, psychologists, 
and mathematicians who participated in this discussion were interested in the viability of a 
formally structured alternative to theories of behaviour using probability statements to 
describe uncertainty. Contributors include Baumol, Carter, Edwards, Georgescu-Roegen, 
Gould, Niehans, and Weckstein among others. The debate over Shackle’s approach 
culminated in a conference held at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1955 (Bowmann 
1958), as well as in a monographic issue of Metroeconomica in 1959. In 1961 Shackle 
restated his theory in Decision Order and Human Affairs, a volume mainly devoted to answer 
the criticisms he had received throughout the 1950s. Ellsberg (1961: 648) quoted Shackle as a 
main representative of the tradition of thought inspiring his claim that Savage’s framework 
was unable to deal with the problem of choice on the basis of highly incomplete information.   
But after 1961 the influence of Shackle diminished considerably, and this fact 
accounts for the span of this paper. Needless to say, both his theory of expectations and his 
peculiar treatment of time have continued to be referred to by a large number of authors. In   2
particular, Shackle has been considered by both post-Keynesians and Austrians the main 
representative of a decision theory capable of dealing with true, genuine uncertainty. The 
point is that from the early 1960s onwards Shackle’s influence has been more relevant on 
methodological grounds than at the theoretical level; and his readers are mainly to be found 
among economists working in heterodox traditions rather than among mainstream decision 
theorists. Remarkably, the debate on alternative theories of decision making originating with 
both Ellsberg’s 1961 paper on observed violations of subjective expected utility and the 
experimental findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ignored Shackle’s analysis. Notable 
exceptions were Ellsberg’s 1962 doctoral thesis (only recently published as Ellsberg 2001) 
and the works of authors more philosophically oriented like Levi (1966 and 1972) and 
Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982). 
On the contrary, in the years under scrutiny Shackle’s decision theory was mostly 
discussed with reference to its technical content. The focus was on Shackle’s proposal to find 
a measure to represent the subjective perception of uncertain consequences alternative to the 
probability measure of both the frequentists and the subjectivists. After a brief exposition of 
Shackle’s theory, the paper assesses the reception of Shackle’s 1949 volume as well as the 
ensuing discussion in the 1950s. A section is devoted to Arrow’s critical remarks and 
changing attitude towards Shackle; the following ones considers the arguments of other 
critics. The focus is on two main issues. The reactions to Shackle’s proposal to abandon 
probability distributions as a meaningful representation of the individual’s subjective 
perception of an uncertain environment are examined in detail. Furthermore, emphasis is 
placed on the criticism addressed to Shackle’s peculiar method of ordering uncertain 
consequences.  
Our claim is that Shackle’s theory was a much more viable alternative to subjective 
expected utility than both its contemporary critics and modern decision theorists have 
recognised. This claim has been discussed in Basili and Zappia (2003a and 2003b), where 
Shackle’s non-probabilistic conceptualisation of individual decisions under uncertainty is 
compared with a most interesting recent approach to uncertainty, the so-called non-additive 
probability approach. This paper is meant to substantiate the view that Shackle’s measure to 
represent individual preferences is of the same kind as the measures emerging from non-  3
additive probability theory. In order to do so we provide an accurate analysis of the existing 
critical literature on Shackle and of primary sources alike.
1 
  Preliminarily, a main question underlying the debate is worth pointing out. The 
discussion between Shackle and his critics unfolded in the interlude between von Neumann 
and Morgenstern’s enunciation of a set of axioms leading to the assumption of maximising 
expected utility – entailing that individuals are endowed with probabilities – and Savage’s 
axiomatisation – entailing that individual subjective probabilities are elicited from choices. As 
a result Shackle did not deal with Savage’s version of the probabilistic approach at the time 
that his own theory had its greatest impact. Moreover, even when he started making reference 
to the subjective approach Shackle did not provide an accurate assessment of the subjectivist 
“revolution” in decision theory, at least until the 1972 volume Epistemics and Economics. 
Basically, Shackle’s point was that the same critical remarks he used to make against the use 
of probability distributions for crucial decisions could be levelled against Savage as well. On 
the other hand, the authors discussing Shackle’s theory were well aware of the developments 
represented by Savage’s Foundations; to some extent this awareness is recognizable even 
before Savage’s volume provided consistent axiomatic foundations for the subjective 
approach.
2 As will be shown, this asymmetry sometimes makes the debate between Shackle 
and his critics quite odd. 
In retrospect, this asymmetry also reveals that Shackle’s enterprise partook of utopia. 
The way in which Shackle refused to attribute to subjective probability theory the status of a 
substantial step towards the explanation of decisions under uncertainty, and continued to 
defend his viewpoint as necessarily non probabilistic, constitutes one the clearest examples of 
a dissenting economist pursuing utopian ideas in the history of twentieth-century economics.  
 
 
                                                 
1   We will make reference to the correspondence section of George Shackle’s papers held in 
Cambridge University Library and catalogued as Add. MS 7669. Shackle divided his correspondence 
into two main categories: letters on Expectation in Economics and its sequels, which he called “ee 
letters,” and letters on other topics of interest. The “ee letters” are mostly letters to Shackle, and only a 
few have responses from Shackle. But it can be argued that the essence of Shackle’s counter-
arguments to critics of the early version of his theory is to be found in his published writings, as 
Shackle himself stated in his preface to Decision, Order and Human Affair, a volume mostly devoted 
to rejoinders to commentators (Littlechild 2000). 
2   It is worth recalling that Savage’s paper “Notes on the Foundations of Statistics” circulated in 
the United States as background material for a course he gave in the winter of 1951 at the University 
of Chicago, that is well before a revised version was published as Savage 1954. A first summary of 
Savage’s viewpoint appeared in the “report” section of Econometrica, as abstract of the paper 
presented at the annual meetings of the Econometric Society (Savage 1950).   4
2. Shackle’s non-probabilistic approach 
 
Most economic decisions, Shackle argued (1949b: 6), are crucial, unique “experiments,” 
namely situations where “the person concerned cannot exclude from his mind the possibility 
that the very act of performing the experiment may destroy forever the circumstances in 
which it was performed.” The fact that these decisions are non-replicable precludes the 
possibility of applying probabilities, both numerical probabilities according to the frequency 
probability theory and, later, subjective probabilities. 
Shackle’s argument had a clear Knightian flavour. The use of probability calculus to 
analyse decisions under uncertainty was inappropriate, in his view, simply because the 
conditions required for its application do not exist in many relevant economic contexts; a 
similar stance underpins Knight’s distinction between risk, or “measurable uncertainty,” and 
proper uncertainty, or “unmeasurable uncertainty.” Shackle’s contention was that in reality 
individuals do not have a complete knowledge of the structure of the world - a knowledge that 
the construction of probability calculus assumes. Individual choices are made between 
alternatives which are subjective representations of alternative future sequels to actions, and 
not between future sequels themselves. In Shackle’s words, “choice is among imagined 
experiences”, a view which implies that the individual is not given an exhaustive list of the 
alternatives between which choice should be made.  
In particular, Shackle argued that individuals are not capable of enumerating all 
possible contingencies, or states of the world. In a sense, the individual agent is able to take 
decisions only insofar as she creates her own choice set, but this necessarily implies that the 
choice set thus created is non-closed. This is the main analytical point at the basis of 
Shackle’s theory.
3 On this basis, Shackle developed a formal theory intended to capture both 
the mental processes and the non-repetitive, and often irreversible, nature of actual economic 
decisions. Shackle’s argument was initially intended to oppose the objective frequency-ratio 
interpretation of probability, which he regarded as the mainstream view in the late 1940s. In 
1961, however, he maintained that the same argument could apply to the subjective 
interpretation of probability (Shackle 1961). The fact that Savage’s subjectivist revolution did 
                                                 
3   To economists working in heterodox traditions of thought, like the post Keynesians and the 
Austrians, this point has become an indispensable analytical reference in their effort to represent 
decisions under genuine uncertainty (for instance, see Davidson 1983). In particular, this is the crucial 
argument upon which the distinction between “rational ignorance” and “radical ignorance” has been 
drawn in the Austrian tradition (Langlois 1994 and Vaughn 1994). By this distinction, the Austrians 
intend to distinguish Savage’s approach from the Knightian tradition. On this point see Zappia (1998).   5
not induce Shackle to change his mind on the applicability of probability calculus is crucial 
for our reconstruction. This aspect of his position will be taken up in the following sections. 
To dispense with probability, Shackle put forward the concept of potential surprise. 
First, he distinguished between distributional uncertainty variables, which can be used if “the 
list [of suggested answers to a question] is complete without a residual hypothesis,” and non-
distributional uncertainty variables, which must be used when “the list in order to attain 
formal completeness must be rounded off with a residual hypothesis” (Shackle 1961: 49-50). 
In order to describe the “mental state of uncertainty” of the decision-maker, Shackle 
maintained, “the inclusion of a residual hypothesis in his list of suggested answers is his 
acknowledgement that he has no basis for considering his existing list of particularised 
hypotheses to be comprehensive.” 
As a result, what was needed was “a measure of acceptance, of a hypothesis proposed 
in answer to some question, that shall be independent of the degrees of acceptance 
simultaneously accorded to rival hypothesis;” that is, Shackle’s framework required “a 
measure of acceptance by which the individual can give to new rival hypotheses, which did 
not at first occur to him, some degree, and even the highest degree, of acceptance without 
reducing the degrees of acceptance accorded to any of those already present in his mind” 
(Shackle 1949-50: 70). This measure of acceptance, called “potential surprise,” amounts to 
Shackle’s substitute for probability distributions, to be used under uncertainty. It is worth 
noting from the outset that the distinction between distributional and non-distributional 
variables shows that Shackle’s theory is essentially non-additive. As will be argued below, 
Shackle showed clear awareness of this characteristic in replying to some critics of his 1949 
volume Expectation in Economics. 
Shackle’s next step was to apply this (non-additive) measure. He analyzed a decision-
maker, typically an entrepreneur, who had to choose among alternative “sequels” to actions 
on the basis of two elements: the possible gains and losses embedded in a sequel, called face-
values, and a valuation of the “possibility” of the gains and losses, called potential surprise. 
The latter element can be considered as a degree of disbelief, or implausibility of the 
hypothesis that supports the sequel; it ranges from 0 (absence of disbelief or zero potential 
surprise) to a maximum value expressing impossibility (absolute disbelief or maximum   6
potential surprise).
4 When the decision maker chooses among alternative sequels, she re-
considers the face-values of each sequel by their degree of potential surprise. 
Finally, Shackle defined a function φ, called “degree of stimulus” (or “ascendancy 
function”) whose arguments are the face-values and the associated potential surprises implicit 
in a sequel. Given a degree of stimulus, it is possible to determine a prospect of the possible 
outcomes of a sequel weighed by degrees of reliability. On this ranking of outcomes, Shackle 
superimposed “the particular potential surprise curve which [the decision maker] assigns to 
some particular project.” 
Following this procedure Shackle (1953, p. 46) determined “the highest bids which the 
particular project in question can make for the decision maker’s attention and interest. One of 
these bids is the most powerful suggestion of success and the other the most powerful 
suggestion of disaster that the conception of project conveys.” These extreme values represent 
the limits of all possible outcomes of any feasible sequel, after the outcomes and their 
potential surprise are valued in terms of the attitude the decision-maker shows towards the 
uncertain situation. Finally, the criterion for choice Shackle proposed amounts to a rule of 
thumb by which the decision maker takes into account both “the best possible” and the “worst 
possible” outcomes of each sequel, respectively called “focus-gain” and “focus-loss.”
  As 
Shackle (1953: 47) summarised: “because the project is a non-divisible non-seriable 
experiment, his [the entrepreneur] various hypotheses as to its outcome are mutually 
exclusive and therefore there is here no logical basis for the additive procedure by which a 
‘mathematical expectation’ is assigned to a divisible experiment.” 
This way of formulating a criterion for decisions can be phrased in the language of 
modern decision theory. Shackle’s decision-maker first orders prospect revenues of an act 
(sequel) on the basis of both their value and their reliability, and then she re-evaluates them 
by her specific (that is, relative to the project at hand) attitude towards the uncertain 
environment. At this point, she takes into account the best and the worst outcomes involved in 
the feasible act, instead of calculating an expected value of the act. Eventually acts are ranked 
in terms of the best/worst pairs, and the decision set-up is represented by an indifference map, 
                                                 
4   The aim of measuring the degree of belief in a certain event by means of its opposite, the 
degree of disbelief, or potential surprise, is instrumental to the construction of a non-additive index. 
The emergence of a new unanticipated event does not necessarily reduce the degree of disbelief 
previously assigned to other events, as it would be if (the opposite of) this degree is measured by a 
probability. “By disbelief I do not now mean the absence of perfect certainty, but the positive 
recognition of some disabling circumstances … and there is, in general, no limit to the number of 
mutually exclusive hypotheses to all of which simultaneously a person can, without logical 
contradiction, attach zero potential surprise” (Shackle 1952, pp. 30-31).   7
which Shackle called the “gambler indifference map.”  This map is almost analogous in shape 
to the indifference map of a consumer who consumes a bundle including one bad (the worst 
outcome, measured on the horizontal axis) and one good (the best outcome, measured on the 
vertical axis) (Shackle 1953, p. 48). 
Shackle was well aware that he was proposing a heresy. “Those accustomed to think 
in terms of the actuarial calculation of the result of a divisible experiment,” Shackle (1953: 
42-43) admitted, “will find this point exceedingly hard to appreciate.” His argument was at 
times extremely naïve: “Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the decision-maker does 
fix his attention momentarily on one of the interior hypotheses, the idea of a small gain, by 
hypothesis, is perfectly easy to imagine as the outcome of the project. But his attention will 
not rest on that hypothesis. His mind will be immediately challenged by the thought that much 
larger gains are equally easy to imagine: why then stop at the relatively small one?” 
Moreover, his argument is weakened by the fact that he did not discuss at sufficient length the 
cognitive bases of the advocated procedure of selecting only two values for each sequel of 
action. 
Nonetheless Shackle was clear that he was suggesting a procedure alternative to von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s maximin criterion, which Wald (1950) had transformed into a 
criterion for decisions under complete uncertainty. Shackle (1953: 43) first observed that “the 
fundamental hypothesis of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games is that a 
decision-maker will choose that action (strategy) whose worst possible outcome is the least 
bad amongst the respective worst possible outcomes of all the actions open to him.” Then he 
added: when players do not have the “comprehensive, exact and certain knowledge” supposed 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s setup, “would the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
hypothesis be more plausible than that the decision-maker will choose that action whose best 
possible outcome is the best amongst the respective best possible outcomes of all the actions 
open to him?” A maximax criterion, Shackle maintained, should be considered equally 
plausible at least. But, he concluded, “there is surely a third [criterion] which is more 
plausible, and of more general analytical power, than either of the two former, namely, that he 
[the decision-maker] will take into account both the ‘best possible’ and the ‘worst possible’ 
outcome of each course of action and make these pairs of outcomes the basis of his decision.” 
In what follows, this third criterion will be referred to as Shackle’s criterion. 
 
 
   8
3. Arrow on Shackle 
 
To assess Shackle’s role in the development of decision theory in the late 1940s and early 
1950s it is appropriate to begin with Arrow’s 1951 article on alternative approaches to the 
theory of choice in “risk-taking” situations. In fact, this article was probably the most referred 
survey on decision making of the 1950s, at least until there appeared Luce and Raiffa’s 
chapter on individual decision making under uncertainty in their celebrated volume on game 
theory (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). Furthermore, as Arrow made reference to Shackle in two 
other articles of his on this topic (Arrow 1959, 1972), his changing attitude will be taken as  
evidence for our thesis. 
As noted in the introduction, Arrow (1951, p. 404) gave sizeable relevance to 
Shackle’s analysis because it was the single formalised theory among those put forward by a 
group of  authors who, following in Knight and Keynes’s footsteps, “do use other than 
probability statements in their description of behaviour under uncertainty.” Arrow’s 
comments were mostly dismissive. Arrow first discussed Shackle’s view on the feasibility of 
a representation of uncertainty alternative to probability, and then his criterion for the 
ordering of alternative situations. As for the first issue, Arrow  (1951, pp. 419-420) recalled 
that Shackle’s theory “rejects the degree-of-belief theory of probability, since a distribution 
can never be verified even ex post, while the frequency theory is inapplicable where definite 
repetition is impossible.” Then he presented Shackle’s potential surprise function and 
discussed the rules combining potential surprises. Arrow observed that the rules proposed by 
Shackle were such that “there is no law of large numbers or elimination of risk by 
consolidation of independent events, for the potential surprise function attached to a sequence 
of unfavourable outcomes is as large as to any one.” As a result “no amount of repetition in 
independent trials would lead to reduction of risks, whereas even Shackle concedes that in 
long runs probability rules would be applicable.” However, Shackle’s theory “does not lead, 
even in the limit, to the probability theory.” Therefore Arrow’s first conclusion was that “the 
elimination of all probability elements form Shackle’s theory cannot be regarded as 
satisfactory.”  
As for the second question, Arrow (1951, pp. 432-433) summarised how Shackle had 
identified pairs of gains and losses and how he had elaborated an ordering among pairs, 
represented by the gambler indifference map. The fact that only two possible outcomes are 
singled out is commented as follows: “Shackle has the sound impulse to base a theory of 
uncertainty-bearing on the necessity of the human mind to simplify a problem in order to be   9
able to deal with it. However, his particular simplification seems to be purely arbitrary.” 
Hence Arrow (1951, p. 433) concluded: “this theory is not based on consideration of rational 
behaviour, which Shackle specifically rejects, but on an alleged inability of the mind to 
consider simultaneously mutually exclusive events.” 
A further, important comment is contained in the 1951 article. Among other theories, 
Arrow discussed those that seek to relate empirical observations to probability judgments via 
the law of large numbers. To criticise these theories, Arrow approvingly reported Knight’s 
and Shackle’s point that if individuals do not have the possibility to repeat an experiment 
indefinitely, probabilities cannot be interpreted as long-run frequencies ratio, and hence are 
irrelevant for their conduct. He concludes: “this argument would obviously have no validity in 
the degree-of-belief theory of probability” (Arrow 1951, p. 415).
5 Savage’s Foundations were 
still to come, but Savage’s influence is apparent. Arrow (1951, p. 414) made clear that by 
degree-of-belief probability theory he meant a theory in which the “fundamental description 
of uncertainty is couched in terms involving other than probability statements, but certain 
postulates are placed on the behaviour of individuals under those conditions, and it is shown 
that they then act as if there were an a priori distribution of probabilities.” Arrow illustrated 
this procedure as follows. On the one hand, he referred to Ramsey and de Finetti’s procedure 
of eliciting probabilities from actions. An abstract of Savage’s paper presented at the 1950 
meeting of the Econometric Society (Savage 1950) was mentioned to indicate that an 
axiomatisation of a subjective theory of probability built on Ramsey and de Finetti’s lines of 
was in the pipeline.  On the other hand, Arrow cited a working paper by Chernoff (to be 
published as Chernoff 1954), where, first, a number of “reasonable” basic properties that 
decision criteria should fulfil were stated, and, second, alternative criteria were discussed. 
Chernoff’s procedure was investigated in two working papers by Hurwicz (1951a) and Arrow 
himself (1953), and it was widely used in those years, before the advent of Savage’s 
approach.
6 
                                                 
5    Arrow’s evaluation of Knight’s theory matched his evaluation of Shackle’s. After 
reconstructing Knight’s viewpoint he commented: “Knight’s uncertainties seem to have surprisingly 
many of the properties of ordinary probabilities, and it is not clear how much is gained by the 
distinction” (Arrow 1951, p. 417).  
6   See in particular Milnor (1954) and Luce and Raiffa  (1957, chapter 13). Both Arrow and 
Hurwicz did not publish their results until Arrow and Hurwicz 1972, though the so-called Hurwicz’s 
optimal criterion for decision making under uncertainty was referred to as a suitable criterion since the 
early 1950s, as it was presented at the 1950 annual meeting of the Econometric Society (Hurwicz 
1951b).   10
Arrow made reference to Shackle at least in two other articles. Both are contributions 
to volumes discussing Shackle’s theory, presumably invited contributions. The first paper 
appeared in the monographic 1959 issue of Metroeconomica devoted to Shackle’s theory ten 
years after the publication of Expectations and Economics. The paper contains only a brief 
reference to Shackle’s work, which in the meantime had become, in Arrow’s view, a 
negligible alternative to the consolidated mainstream. Arrow (1959, p. 13) depicted the state 
of the art in decision theory at the end of the 1950s as dominated by a basic structure 
“accepted by virtually all participants in the discussion.” This basic structure is summarised 
through, first, a function which relates consequences to actions and states of nature, and, 
second, a criterion to select an action from a given opportunity set of actions. The crucial 
component of this basic structure, which explains how the various theories differ, is “a 
weighting of the different states of nature.” “Most theories”, Arrow (1959, p. 14) stated, “tend 
to include a range of weights for different states. If these weights satisfy certain formal rules 
of combination, they are referred to as probabilities.” And then he offered his only comment 
on Shackle: “Shackle’s concept of potential surprise is an alternative formulation of weights, 
with different combination rules.” It is worth noting that, though apparently dismissive of 
Shackle, this suggestion reveals that Arrow correctly understood  the point made by the early 
critics of the subjectivist approach like Edwards (1954) – later made explicit by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) – that the epistemic state of the decision-maker could be characterised by 
non-additive measures. But Shackle did not discussed Arrow’s point.
 7 
Arrow also mentions Shackle’s theory in a joint paper with Hurwicz, contributed to a 
1972 volume in honour of Shackle. Arrow and Hurwicz (1972, p. 1) provided “a possible 
characterisation of the concept of complete ignorance,” defined as “a situation in which there 
is no a priori information available which gives any state of nature a distinguished position”, 
and as a situation “not presupposing a fixed list of states of nature.” They clarified from the 
outset that under these hypotheses the criterion they provided differed from those formulated 
within the “now more standard subjective probability framework,” and that their arguments 
and conclusions “are much closer to Shackle’s (1949) than those of Ramsey (1931), de Finetti 
(1937), and Savage (1954).” In situations of complete ignorance, Arrow and Hurwicz (1972, 
p. 2) argued, the subjective probability framework can only assign equal probabilities to all 
the states of nature, in accordance with Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason. Shackle’s 
formulation, on the other hand, permits to interpret complete ignorance as meaning that all 
                                                 
7   It is worth noting that Arrow’s article is the only one among the articles published in the   11
states of nature have zero potential surprise. As a result, if a description of the world needs 
making finer than previously anticipated (a likely situation if complete ignorance is assumed), 
this can be done easily in Shackle’s but not in the subjectivists’ framework.
8 As seen in the 
previous section, and as Shackle argued many times in response to his critics (see next 
section), this capability of accounting for new, unanticipated events is precisely one of the 
reasons for the use of potential surprise. 
Arrow and Hurwicz then proceeded along the lines of Chernoff (1954) and Milnor 
(1954). First, they postulated a set of “desirable” properties of a rational criterion of choice. 
These are mostly properties regarding the relationships between sets of actions, identified as 
decision problems; these sets permit the identification of the minimum and the maximum 
value associated with each decision problem under any particular state of nature. Second, they 
proved that the necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing that an optimality criterion 
possesses the postulated properties are related only to the minimum and the maxim value. 
That is, any criterion consistent with those desirable properties ranks actions solely on the 
basis of their best and worst possible outcomes, and not on the basis of averages. Finally, 
Arrow and Hurwicz (1972: 2) commented on Shackle’s theory that if the focus values of 
Shackle are interpreted as the minimum and maximum payoff to a given action, and the final 
decision among possible actions is made on the basis of the gambler indifference map, “we 
demonstrate that a plausible set of desirable properties for a rational criterion of choice under 
complete ignorance in fact leads to this special case of Shackle’s theory.”  
The conclusion Arrow and Hurwicz reached is nothing short of surprising. As 
documented above, Arrow’s previous analysis of Shackle’s theory (1951) had been detailed 
but dismissive, in particular as regards the selection of the focus outcomes, termed “purely 
arbitrary.” Furthermore the 1959 paper mentioned Shackle only as a minor detour from the 
main developments. In 1972, on the contrary, the reader is told that, considering that there are 
situations in which there is no reason to suppose that the decision maker has a reliable 
subjective probability distribution over possible future events, she would better follow 
Shackle’s procedure of ranking actions in terms of only two values. The opening footnote of 
                                                                                                                                                          
Metroeconomica 1959 issue not quoted in the bibliography of Shackle 1961.  
8   In the subjectivist approach if the event on which choices are conditioned is not in the list of 
the possible states the decision maker is forced to modify the probability weights originally attributed 
to the states, because the weights add up to 1. As noted in the previous section, Shackle insisted that a 
correct representation of the epistemic state of an individual should make room for a “residual 
hypothesis” without reducing the weights attributed to the original list of states. However, this can be 
achieved also in a probabilistic approach, if the probability measure on the original list of states is 
subadditive.    12
the 1972 paper mentioning the dates at which Arrow and Hurwicz obtained their results adds 
to the surprise. Arrow and Hurwicz (1972, p. 1 f.) acknowledged that Hurwicz had attained 
the basic result of the essay in the 1951 working paper quoted above, while Arrow’s 
contribution  (circulated in the 1953 working paper quoted above) was said to consist in a 
considerably simplified proof of Hurwicz’s result. The 1972 version, Arrow and Hurwicz add, 
did not represent a major development over the working papers of the 1950s. The point to 
stress is that Arrow and Hurwicz recognised that Shackle’s criterion could be interpreted as a 
version of Hurwicz’s criterion only in 1972, while the main result was proved in 1953.
9 
It is worth observing that Wald’s maximin is a special case of Hurwicz’s criterion. 
Wald (1950) discussed the decision problem as a two-person zero-sum game where the 
decision maker plays against Nature. The maximin strategy was shown by Wald to be a best 
response against Nature’s minimax strategy, that is, against the least favourable a priori 
distribution Nature can employ. Wald’s criterion is extremely conservative in a context of 
complete ignorance, where conservatism may make good sense.
10 Hurwicz (1951) introduced 
a parameter intended to obviate the conservative (or pessimistic) procedure of concentrating 
only on states having the worst consequences. Hurwicz’s criterion selects the minimum (m) 
and the maximum (M) payoff to each given action and then associates the index αM+(1-α)m 
to each action. Of any two actions, the one with the maximum index would be preferred. If 
α=0 Hurwicz’s criterion is the maximin criterion, while if α=1 it is the maximax criterion. 
After labelling Wald’s maximin criterion as “ultraconservative,” Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 
282) presented the rationale of Hurwicz’s amendment in the following way: “Why not look at 
the best state, or at a weighted combination of the best and worst?” The resemblance with 
Shackle’s apparently odd statement on von Neumann-Morgenstern’s criterion (quoted in the 
previous section) is striking. 
It is appropriate to outline the importance of the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion for modern 
decision theory. The Arrow-Hurwicz criterion has originated a literature on decision making 
under complete ignorance (for instance, see Kelsey 1993). Savage’s subjective expected 
utility theory applies to situations in which the individual acts as if he had a single reliable 
probability distribution over the states of the world (elicited from choices). Conversely, 
                                                 
9   An analogous understanding of the relationships between Shackle’s and Hurwicz’s criterion 
can be found in Ellsberg doctoral thesis, submitted to the Economics Department at Harvard 
University in 1962, but published only as late as 2001 (Ellsberg 2001, p. 163). 
10   It is worth noting that the literature on environmental problems, where decisions are typically 
irreversible and potentially high losses related to catastrophic events are to be considered, makes 
explicit reference to Wald-related criteria and to Shackle’s focus-loss (for instance, see Perrings 2003).   13
Arrow and Hurwicz introduced the case in which the individual has no idea at all about the 
likelihood of states. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have proposed an alternative to subjective 
expected utility to encompass the case between these two extremes, that is the case in which 
the individual has opinions about the likelihood of different states, but she is not able to 
assign exact probabilities to them. According to their theory the decision maker has a convex 
set of subjective probability, which expresses the range of probabilities she considers 
possible. Since the subjective probability is not unique there is a set of expected utilities for 
each action. Gilboa and Schmeidler then axiomatised the following criterion: an action a is 
preferred to b if and only if the minimum possible value of the expected utility of a is greater 
than the minimum expected value of b. Following on Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982), they have 
called this criterion maximin expected utility. If the set of probabilities consists only of a 
single probability distribution, maximin expected utility coincides with subjective expected 
utility. If, on the other hand, it consists of all possible probability distributions it coincides 
with Wald’s maximin.  
There is a close relationship between maximin expected utility and non-additive 
probability theory which needs emphasising. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) showed that there 
is an isomorphism between a non-additive probability measure and a convex set of additive 
probability measure. The interest in non-additive measure increased after Ellsberg’s findings 
(1961), because decision-makers are shown to exhibit a pessimistic attitude towards uncertain 
situations and this can be rationalised through the use of a sub-additive probability measure. 
As a result, in the search for decisional criteria to be used in Ellsberg’s type situations the 
criteria in the Arrow-Hurwicz tradition are suitable candidates. The concluding section will 
show why this reconstruction of the literature originated by Arrow and Hurwicz’s 1972 paper 
corroborates the thesis of Basili and Zappia (2003a and 2003b). 
 
 
4. Shackle and his critics: late 1940s and early 1950s 
 
In this section we assess the discussion between Shackle and his critics on the non-
probabilistic approach developed in Expectations and Economics. The discussion centred 
around the two main points which emerged from Arrow’s 1951 review. As seen in the 
previous section, Arrow’s first argument was that the subjective probability approach (in the 
making in the early 1950s) was a sufficient response to Knight’s contention that uncertainty is 
probabilistically unmeasurable. Arrow’s view that it is legitimate to represent individuals’   14
beliefs by a single additive probability measure in every uncertain situations set the standard, 
and became the mainstream position even before the axiomatisation provided by Savage. 
Hence the origin of the orthodox position in modern decision theory should probably be found 
in Arrow’s article rather than in Savage’s volume. Arrow’s second point was that Shackle’s 
criteria for ordering actions had no theoretical foundation. As shown, Arrow changed his 
mind on this issue, but his recantation came too late to rescue Shackle’s view from oblivion. 
 The material of this section is the comments and rejoinders that were published in 
major journals during the 1950s as well as a few volumes dealing with Shackle’s theory. 
Shackle’s correspondence included in the Shackle’s Papers at Cambridge University Library 
is also used. Our aim is to show that certain critics correctly understood two aspects of the 
utmost importance of Shackle’s theory: the implications of the non-additive character of the 
theory, and the possibility of interpreting Shackle’s ascendancy functions as a specific 
distortion of the weighting function of the decision maker. It will be argued that Shackle’s 
inability to fully appreciate the arguments of  those critics is a major reason explaining why 
decision theorists gave up discussing his theory after the 1950s. Furthermore it will be 
highlighted the influence on discussion of Shackle’s refusal to take into consideration 
Savage’s new interpretation of probability theory. In particular, the appeal of Shackle’s 
insistence that probability was not apt to be applied to unique decisions diminished 
considerably among commentators in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
It is worth recalling before proceeding that Shackle’s theory was not only widely 
discussed in the 1950s, but also followed by a few contributions intended to develop it. There 
were contributions devoted to applications to the theory of profit (Keirstead 1953) and to 
multi-period investment decisions (Egerton 1955 and 1960). The influence of Shackle’s ideas 
was explicitly acknowledged in Lachmann (1956), Fossati (1957) and Niehans (1959), among 
others. The relevance for a theory of expectations was discussed in Carter (1953), Gorman 
(1957), Gould (1957) and Foldes (1958). Even authors sceptical about the internal consistency 
of the theory referred to it, in the same vein of Arrow, as the only formalised alternative to 
probability theory in the early 1950s (for instance, see Hahn 1955-6). Moreover, in the hope 
of creating consensus around his theory, Shackle himself attempted to provide applications of 
the theory to the analysis of liquidity preference and demand for assets (Shackle 1958) and to 
the theory of interest rates (Shackle 1961, chapter 27).  
  Immediately after the publication of Expectations and Economics Shackle was 
absorbed in two main tasks. On the one hand he answered  reviewers, and on the other tried to 
elucidate the crucial elements of his theory. Before Arrow’s 1951 survey reviewers of   15
Shackle’s volume generally showed great interest and admiration, with specific regard to 
Shackle’s aim to provide a formalised alternative to the frequency probability tradition, 
clearly inadequate to deal with Knightian uncertainty. Two short notes appeared in 
Economica and were followed by Shackle’s rejoinder. The note by Graaff and Baumol is 
central because it set the tone of Arrow’s and other mainstream decision theorists’ position. 
Graaff and Baumol (1949: 338-39) expressed very well the excitement of the economics 
profession confronted with the “quite devastating criticism of the orthodox probability 
approach to expectations to be found in most theoretical discussions by professional 
economists.” They also wrote  (1949: 341) that the idea of potential surprise “represents a step 
towards what one might perhaps call a truly subjective theory of confidence.” Graaff and 
Baumol viewed favourably the possibility that “the development of an essentially subjective 
theory of expectation, and especially of the confidence with which these expectations are 
held” had a revolutionary impact, similar to that which “occurred in the central body of 
theoretical economics when the subjective theory of value was developed.” 
Graaff and Baumol then moved on to criticise the details of Shackle’s proposal, in 
particular his exclusive concern with the focus-gain and the focus-loss of each actions. As 
later agreed by Arrow, they contended that “it is not altogether clear whether Mr. Shackle 
presents the hypothesis that people concentrate on the focus-outcomes as no more than a 
useful simplification of reality, of the kind we are continually looking for in our research, or 
whether he means it to be taken quite literally.” This aspect was considered of the utmost 
importance because “it is upon the empirical premises and not on any assertion of rationality 
that Mr. Shackle’s analysis is based.” Graaff and Baumol elaborated a simple example in 
which it was obvious to expect that the decision-maker  would consider relevant not only the 
focus values but also the whole range of possible outcomes. Moreover they were unsatisfied 
with Shackle’s suggestion that “in a one-and-for-all decision one can afterwards derive cold 
comfort from the knowledge that there were alternative gains and losses conceivable.” Thus 
they concluded: “one cannot help feeling that it is somewhat rational to choose the alternative 
with the greater actuarial value even where, because the experiment is unique, the actuarial 
calculation cannot be taken literally.” (Graaff and Baumol 1949: 342). 
  In his reply Shackle (1949b: 343) persisted in his initial position that any crucial 
decision – that is, a decision whose outcome “will affect the whole future course of relevant   16
events for the individual” – is a “unique trial.”
11 Any crucial decision is “necessarily unique” 
because “by making it the individual gives himself a new set of circumstances and 
opportunities, so that it is logically impossible for him ever to repeat the experiment which 
brought this new situation about.” Even the toss of a coin, Shackle argued, can be considered 
a unique trial if  “it is for choice of … innings in a Test Match.”
12 However he could not offer 
a reason for the procedure of selecting two values, except for a critique of  the widespread 
practice to apply probabilities even to single trials: “What is the source of my critics’ feeling 
that other elements besides the two ‘most powerful’ are taken into account of in the 
individual’s final decision? I think it is that they are still unconsciously thinking in terms of 
numerical probability and of repeated trials forming parts of a larger whole which alone is 
significant” (Shackle 1949b: 345). 
  The exchange with Graaff and Baumol set the tone of the whole debate. In private 
correspondence Houthakker argued: “Although I have sincere admiration for the originality 
and lucidity of your exposition … I am not quite convinced by your attempt to replace the 
approach based on probability considerations. I think that your objections to the latter are too 
exclusively directed against the frequency theory of probability, which is by no means 
generally accepted. … Despite your remarks in Economica … I fail to see any logical reason 
why expectations which cause greater or smaller potential surprise than the ‘focus values’ 
should not be of importance in arriving at a decision.” He then moved on to show why, in his 
view, the axioms of Expectations and Economics failed to justify the use of potential 
surprise.
13  
  The other note published in the 1949 issue of Economica, by Ralph Turvey, addressed 
the question of the differences between Shackle’s approach and “the orthodox analysis of 
uncertainty.” Turvey (1949: 337-338) distinguished between the use of the frequency 
                                                 
11   By unique trial Shackle  (1949b: 343) meant “one which is unique in its effect on the life of 
the individual who makes it, that is, a trial whose character and circumstances are not sufficiently like 
those of other trials which he expects to make for him to treat all these trials as parts of a larger whole, 
with whose outcome as a whole, and not with those of the separate trials composing it, he is really 
concerned.” 
12   The deliberate inability to distinguish between “crucial decision” and “unique decision” was 
the target of harsh criticism from practically all commentators, even from those who conceded that 
Shackle’s theory was a viable alternative to the mainstream. For instance, see Shubik 1954 and 
Georgescu-Roegen 1958). 
13   Letter from H. S. Houthakker to Shackle, May 5, 1950  (Add. MS 7669, 9/1/5). An analogous 
position was expressed in private correspondence by Modigliani who questioned both the consistency 
of the axioms and the details of the potential surprise function: “I notice that in commenting in 
Economica on the review of Graaff and Baumol you failed to take up the problem they raised with 
their example.” Letter from F. Modigliani to Shackle, Feb. 20, 1950 (Add. MS 7669, 9/1/4).   17
probability distribution, apt to deal with Knight’s risk, the use of the subjective probability 
distribution, apt to deal with Knight’s uncertainty, and the use of the potential surprise 
function. He correctly argued that, although at first sight the latter seemed to be merely an 
inverted subjective probability function, this was not the case because “while for any value of 
x maximum potential surprise correspond to zero likelihood, zero potential surprise will only 
mean unit likelihood in a very special case … since the realisation of a particular value of x 
may cause no surprise even though that result was not considered certain.” As Turvey 
established (1949: 338), this implied non-additiveness of potential surprise, and “there would 
be no meaning in performing a weighted average on the potential surprise function – hence 
the concept of focus gain and focus loss.”  
  Turvey’s note opened the debate on the meaning of non-additiveness of potential 
surprise. Shackle (1949-50) was keen to acknowledge this property as essential, but refused to 
consider it as a component of the procedure of attributing probabilistic weights alternative to 
subjective probability, as suggested by Turvey. Shackle (1949-50: 73-74), in particular, did 
not recognised the key role of the distinction between frequency probability and subjective 
probability distributions: “If, for the analysis of choice amongst indivisible real life 
experiment (i.e. choice among courses of action whose outcome cannot be known in 
advance), we discard the notion of frequency-ratio probability, ought we not also to discard 
our predisposition towards additive solutions and start afresh with an open mind?”. As we 




5. Shackle and his critics: late 1950s 
 
In the second half of 1950s two episodes are worth dealing with. The discussion still centred 
around the possibility of regarding Shackle’s theory as a plausible formalised representation 
of Knight’s commonly agreed viewpoint that uncertainty is probabilistically unmeasurable. 
The first, and most relevant episode was the conference on “Expectations, Uncertainty and 
Business Behaviour” organised by the Committee on Business Enterprise Research of the 
Social Science Research Council, and held at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 
Pittsburgh in October 1955. The list of those who attended the conference and contributed a 
paper to the volume collecting its proceedings (Bowman 1958) includes Mary Jean Bowman, 
                                                 
14   As seen earlier this was also Arrow’s 1959 interpretation.   18
Albert Hart, George Katona, Herbert Simon (all members of the Committee), Kenneth 
Boulding, Ward Edwards, Robert Eisner, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Franco 
Modigliani, among others. In her introduction to the volume Bowman (1958: 1) clarified that 
although most contributions were empirically oriented, the organisers thought that a section 
presenting current theoretical developments was essential, because the study of business 
decision making drew upon several distinct fields of learning, including economics and the 
mathematics of probability. 
The theoretical section devoted to economics was titled “Theories of the nature and 
structure and expectations” and consisted of two papers. A survey of the theories of 
probability and expectations by Georgescu-Roegen was followed by Shackle’s presentation of 
the potential surprise approach with application to liquidity preference. The fact that 
Shackle’s paper was the focus of the conference discussion was severely criticised by Tjalling 
Koopmans, who argued in favour of the potentialities of Savage’s approach. Bowman (1958: 
2-3) quotes a sentence from Koopmans’s intervention in the discussion: “I would like to have 
seen more attention given to the axiom system for decision making under uncertainty recently 
developed by Leonard Savage, continuing and extending the work by Ramsey and de Finetti 
… concerned with decision making in general and as such as fundamental to economics as to 
statistics.” 
  Although Shackle could not attend the conference his paper was circulated in advance. 
Bowman summarised the discussion in a letter to Shackle, which clearly shows her role in 
giving Shackle’s theory special relevance in the programme.
15 In his contribution to the 
volume Georgescu-Roegen criticised both what he termed the “Subjectivist” and the 
“Ultrasubjectivist” doctrine. Georgescu-Roegen (1958, p. 21) argued that, as de Finetti 
himself recognised, “the reasonableness of the individual’s decisions involves also the 
question whether his scale of beliefs reflects the properties of the random phenomena.” That 
is, the connection between the physical reality and the subjective world requires an additional 
                                                 
15   Bowman wrote: “I wish you could have been present for the discussion of your paper at the 
conference … Unfortunately Marshack had to back out at the last minute. We were fortunate in getting 
Tjalling Koopmans to take his place … . Ward Edwards provided the most careful and interesting 
discussion, a copy of which I enclose … Koopmans suggested that we need empirical studies to 
discriminate between your approach with the two focus points and the Savage approach which would 
emphasize a central value. … Thank you for letting us have your paper. You may be assured that it 
stirred quite a bit of excitement, even though the fire was aimed at your general theory and not this 
application per se.” Letter from M. J. Bowman to G. L. S. Shackle, November 8, 1955 (Add. MS 
7669, 9/1/148).   19
postulate or principle of some sort, which Savage did not provide.
16 But Georgescu-Roegen 
was critical of Shackle’s “Ultrasubjectivist” theory as well. Georgescu-Roegen considered the 
notion of potential surprise “nothing but a truncated complement of belief.” He then argued: 
“Surprise as understood by everybody and as described by Shackle is simply the state of mind 
created by knowledge of the actual result of an experiment. But this ex post state of the mind 
is conditioned by the ex ante degree of belief.” In Georgescu-Roegen’s view potential surprise 
could be defined simply as the complement to 1 of subjective probability and, as a result, 
potential surprise  was not a novel concept capable of solving the problems that subjective 
probability left unsolved. Georgescu-Roegen was also harshly critical of Shackle’s inability to 
formalise consistently the measure alternative to probability he was proposing.
17 
  The comments made during the discussion were summarised by Bowman in her 
introduction to the book, except for Edwards’s remarks which were published in a note 
following Shackle’s paper.
18 Edwards (1958, p. 44) started with an assessment of Shackle’s 
theory that emphasised the similarity between Shackle’s substitute for probability and a 
probability measure: “On a first reading, Shackle’s concepts seem novel and hard to 
understand. However, with further thought they take on a familiar look in spite of their 
novelty, for in many respects Shackle’s system is rather close to some more familiar 
systems.” “Potential surprise,” Edwards wanted to show, “seems to be very similar to what 
might be called subjective improbability - a subjective probability function standing on his 
head.” But then Edwards moved on to deal with Shackle’s insistence on the ineffectiveness of 
expected utility, which Edwards considered the second main feature of the theory: “Shackle’s 
refusal to add subjective improbabilities, on the other hand, seems to me to be the most 
important and desirable feature of his system. A great deal of experimental evidence that 
bears on the additivity of subjective probability is now available and it argues against the 
                                                 
16   “For certainly a theory of probability cannot concern itself only with internal consistency of 
the acts of an individual, as maintained by Savage,” Georgescu-Roegen (1958: 21) argued. And then 
he concluded “that the Principle of Insufficient Reason partly serves this purpose. But if the 
Subjectivist Theory includes this principle, it can hardly be distinguished from the Classical doctrine.” 
It may be worth noting that this is Ellsberg’s point as well.  
17   In Georgescu-Roegen’s (1958: 21, f.) words: “The axiomatic formulation of the theory is, 
however, far less clear. Axiom 1, for instance, can hardly deserve its title. … Axiom 7 implies that the 
coincidence of two unusual events should not surprise one more than each occurrence taken 
separately. … I hope that he will one day offer a more precise formulation of the relationship between 
degree of potential surprise and degree of belief than the vague wording of Axioms 1 and 3.” 
18    Hart is reported to complain that “the notion that human beings simply cannot set up a 
meaningful ‘subjective probabilities’ and apply them to the likelihood that events may diverge from a 
central estimate strikes me as unacceptable … it would leave us with such very untractable models that 
analysis would be paralysed” (Bowman 1958: 6).   20
additive property so strongly that I do not see how it is possible any longer to defend that 
property. Fortunately, it may be possible to develop a utility-subjective probability model that 
is mathematically satisfactory and that does not require subjective probabilities to add to one 
or anything else.” 
  Edwards’s comments are crucial for our reconstruction. First of all, non-additivity, 
which as seen earlier was a focus of Shackle’s interest from the beginning, was justified by 
Edwards on the basis of experimental evidence. Given that Savage’s theory emphasized the 
internal consistency of individual choice, to show that individuals do not care about 
consistency in certain situations was a significant counter-example to the subjectivist 
approach. In fact, this was Ellsberg’s main theme of his 1961 article, in which he insisted that 
individuals asked to make choices within the framework of the famous urn problem were 
unrepentant violators of Savage’s axioms. Moreover, Edwards hinted at the possibility that a 
suitable modification of Savage’s subjective probability measure, a modification admitting 
the possibility of a non-additive distortion of the probability measure, would render Shackle’s 
approach much more interesting. The utmost importance of Edwards’s comments is 
confirmed by the fact that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) referred mainly to Edwards’s 
experimental results in order to introduce the distortion of probability on which prospect 
theory is based.   
  In her letter to Shackle, Bowman addressed the remark made by many during the 
discussion at the Carnegie Institute that the concept of potential surprise was not clearly 
defined. “Edwards’ approach seems very interesting,” she wrote in informing Shackle that she 
had argued against Edwards “that potential surprise should not be regarded as simply the 
mirror image of the particular type of subjective ‘degree of probability’ that Edwards was 
supporting.” But she added that “Edwards, in contrast to Savage, uses a subjective probability 
concept such that the probabilities are not additive.”
19 Bowman enclosed a copy of Edwards’s 
note, but Shackle did not make any reference to Edwards in the last version of his paper, 
which he eventually submitted with a new introductory section. To the best of our knowledge, 
Shackle never made reference to Edwards in his later works.     
Not surprisingly, Shackle’s attitude towards the new subjective approach is a recurring 
theme in the debate of the second half of the 1950s. Almost all commentators referred to the 
subjectivist developments, but Shackle did not make any effort to understand the development 
in the probabilistic approach implicit in Savage’s axiomatisation. Shackle insisted that even 
                                                 
19   Letter from M. J. Bowman to G. L. S. Shackle, November 8, 1955 (Add. MS 7669, 9/1/148).   21
gambling situations, if interpreted as unique experiments, would require the use of potential 
surprise instead of probabilities. Asked by Gerald Gould (1957) to comment on this point he 
replied: “Some critics … have urged on me the view that it is the kind of uncertainty which 
envelopes the business-man’s decisions, the confusion and fog, as Professor Carter has called 
it, of conflicting indications, the difficulty of interpreting his raw material, that I ought to lay 
stress on, and not the uniqueness of the experiment he makes. However, I think both are true” 
(Shackle 1957: 661). To counter this consideration Gould (1957: 663) was led to stress the 
novelty introduced by Savage: “I should like as a sort of postscript to make a remark about 
the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of utility …that is only applicable to situations were 
numerical probability can be used. … The theory says nothing about a priori behaviour, nor is 
meant to. This point is explained very well by Savage in his Foundations of Statistics.” 
The reference to Carter in Shackle’s quotation is important. Charles F. Carter was one 
of the early advocates of Shackle’s theory. He contributed two papers  to the Economic 
Journal in 1950 and 1953 which provided, first, an assessment of Shackle’s theory, and then a 
generalisation of it intended to strengthen it. He supported Shackle even in the years after 
1961, the time that we take as the point of no return for the interest of decision theorists in 
Shackle’s analysis. In 1972 Carter edited a volume in honour of Shackle including Arrow and 
Hurwicz’s paper referred to in the previous section. Despite all this, in reviewing Shackle’s 
1955 volume collecting the essays of the early 1950s devoted to the restatement of his theory 
Carter pointed out a clear uneasiness about Shackle’s inability to comprehend the subjectivist 
developments. After recalling that Shackle’s opinion of the importance of uncertainty in the 
economic system was accepted by his critics, Carter (1956: 700) stressed that Shackle’s 
theory of expectations was still regarded as an interesting possibility, “but not [as]one of 
which much use need be made.” Carter then commented that, though this decrease of interest 
was disappointing, it was not without reason: “This is not a field of study in which a new 
theory can have strong claims to immediate acceptance; it is not even certain how it can be 
tested, not what range of alternative theories can fit the facts … therefore there is a need for 
people to get together to find the highest common factor of agreement. … But Professor 
Shackle … still gives the impression of campaigning for his own theory, the whole theory, 
and nothing but the theory.” 
Shackle’s attitude towards alternative theories of uncertainty is exemplified by 
Carter’s (1956: 701) reference to Shackle’s failure to distinguish between the frequency and 
the subjective probability approach: “in his justified attacks on the follies of those who apply 
frequency-ratio probability to unique situations, he gives little attention to the tradition of   22
another interpretation of subjective probability. He prefers to stay alone, and in so doing 
makes it difficult for the subject to advance by agreed improvement and amendment.”  This 
statement is typical of a number of comments conveying the concern of authors sympathetic 
with Shackle’s approach, but at odds with both his extremely negative attitude towards the 
application of the subjective approach and his inability to circumscribe the field of application 
of his own approach. 
  The second important episode regarding the diffusion and discussion of Shackle’s 
theory in the late 1950s is the monographic issue of Metroeconomica, an Italian-based 
international journal started in 1949 with the intent to publish technical contributions to 
economics. Shackle contributed a series of article to the first issues of Metroeconomica, 
among which particularly relevant were those intended to restate the main aspects of his 
theory (Shackle 1952 and 1953). The 1959 issue was intended to celebrate the 10
th year of the 
publishing of Expectations and Economics. Apart from Arrow’s article examined earlier, 
there were two papers of major interest for our reconstruction by Jurg Niehans and Richard 
Weckstein. Both Niehans and Weckstein put attention on the alternative notions of probability 
and asked Shackle to take the subjectivist development into account. Niehans (1959: 77-78) 
recalled that “it is Shackle’s basic thesis that probabilities cannot be used to describe the 
uncertainty of expectations of an individual confronted with a decision” and that “Shackle 
seems to suggest that this thesis is self-evident and not in need of any proof.” But, Niehans 
argued, “today, …, in a period of lively discussion of ‘subjective’ probabilities, Shackle 
would hardly feel so confident … I am sure that on the contrary he would be the first to agree 
that his thesis requires to be proved.” Then Niehans summarised Savage’s procedure to elicit 
probabilities from choices and clarified: “this probability order is independent of any 
frequency connotations.” Niehans was also clear that Shackle’s approach had great relevance 
despite his inability to consider the subjectivist approach, because there existed situations in 
which the set of axioms underlying Savage’s approach – and the application of Bernoulli’s 
principle of mathematical expectations – did not apply. It is in this case, Niehans (1959: 87 f.) 
argued, that “a case could be make for a theory which, say, 1) uses probabilities to eliminate 
‘impossible’ states … 2) does not weigh ‘possible outcomes’ with probabilities, 3) lets 
decisions be guided by minimax regret as applied to the matrix of the ‘possible’ outcomes.”
20 
                                                 
20   The minimax regret was introduced in Niehans’ paper as one of the possible criteria intended 
to cover situations in which the validity of the “principle of mathematical expectation” could be 
questioned. Other criteria included “minimax risk” (that is Wald’s criterion) and the theory of Shackle 
(Niehans 1959: 87).     23
Weckstein examined frequency probability, logical probability and subjective 
probability in turn, in order to determinate how apt Shackle’s criticism was, with specific 
regard to the supposed inability of probability measures to deal with unique decisions. As 
Niehans, Weckstein (1959: 116) strongly argued in favour of the probability approach. He 
stressed that the probability of a single event is correctly defined in the subjective 
interpretation of probability: “this concept avoids the difficulties of the frequency notion by 
requiring no statistical evidence at its basis. Indeed there are no evidence requirements for the 
statement of subjective probability at all.”
21 Furthermore, Weckstein contended that it could 
be adequate to use a probability measure even to account for the residual hypothesis. His 
argument needs to be quoted at length, because it offered a link to the incoming developments 
which paralleled Edwards’ remarks: “consider the argument that the probability number 
assigned to the occurrence of an outcome must be changed whenever the number of outcomes 
considered change, and that this adjustment of probability numbers has no analogy in the 
psychology of a decision-maker. This happens to probability statements because of the formal 
requirement that the sum of the probabilities of all of the possible outcomes equals one … 
This is a formal convention which may have no precise analogy in the psychology of decision 
comparable to Shackle’s potential surprise function which is expressed in psychologically 
suggestive terms, but it is a convention which is widely understood.” 
Shackle commented both on Niehans and Weckstein in his 1961 volume. The 
relevance of the points made by them both is testified by the fact that Shackle dedicated to 
each paper a chapter of the book, including a summary of the critic’s argument and his reply. 
Notwithstanding Niehans and Weckstein’s insistence, in neither chapter Shackle recognised 
to Savage’s interpretation of probably a status different from the frequency interpretation. 
Moreover he did not discuss the possibility of alternative criteria of selection of the best 
action. Shackle’s attitude to trivialize the discussion of alternative explanations is evident here 
and comes as a posteriori justification of Carter’s 1956 comments reported above. However 
one specific comment to Weckstein deserves to be reported. Shackle (1961: 107-108) quoted  
Weckstein’s statement on the requirement that probabilities add up to 1 and then commented: 
“When Professor Weckstein speaks of the ‘formal requirement’ that probabilities should sum 
to unity, I feel that his words convey the suggestion that there might be some escape from this 
requirement without abandoning the essence of the notion of probability. Surely this is not so? 
                                                 
21   Weckstein (1959: 110) also argued that even frequency probability could claim to be able to 
deal with singular events on grounds that: “an actual individual event has more than one property on   24
Once we abandon the distributional character of probability we are in an essentially different 
scheme of thought, the conception of a non-distributional uncertainty variable of which 
potential surprise is an example.” The issue of non-additivite probability is apparent but 
Shackle was not able to develop it. 
 
 
6. The utopian character of Shackle’s theory of decision making 
 
As we have detailed, Shackle’s special contribution to economics has been to try to discern 
ways in which the usual treatment of uncertainty diverged for the experience of individuals 
taking decisions in actual context. His aim was to provide a new way of thinking, arguably 
more relevant but no less rigorous in logical and mathematical terms. In his book 
Expectations in Economics Shackle held that in economics there was the prevalent practice of 
ignoring true uncertainty, that is, of expressing it by a numerical probability whose logical 
origin was obscure, to say the least (Ford 1993).  
Among the interpreters of Keynes, Shackle was known for laying the greatest 
emphasis on questions relating to the unpredictability of future as the foundation for 
individual decision making. In his famous critical remarks on the Keynesian schools, 
Coddington  (1982: 480) emphasised that those who attributed great significance to Keynes’ 
work on probability theory and on uncertainty in economic decision making “have singled out 
this uncertainty theme not only for its special importance, but also for his potential for 
analytical subversion.” Coddington made reference to the post-Keynesians like Davidson and 
the radical subjectivists like Shackle and Lachmann. The all-embracing subjectivism of 
Shackle, in particular, was said to be “consistent but analytically nihilistic.” 
The way in which Shackle first established and later defended his non-probabilistic 
approach to decision making  gives substance to this view.
22 But a closer look of the 
relationships between Shackle and the contemporary subjectivist developments may also 
                                                                                                                                                          
the basis of which it may be classified, and therefore its probability of occurrence will be different 
depending upon the class with respect to which it is classified.”  
22   Shackle himself accepted that, from the point of view of “the builders of precise predictive 
models,” he could be considered a nihilistic. From this viewpoint, he contended, also Keynes could 
have been depicted as nihilist (Shackle, 1984: 391).    25
justify the contention that Shackle’s enterprise partook of utopia in the sense of pursuing 
what, in the theoretical context of the 1950s, was an unattainable aim.
23  
The theme of “analytical subversion” is central to Shackle’s endeavour. His main 
objective was to replace the orthodox paradigm for the explanation of individual behaviour 
under uncertainty. But Shackle intended his argument not simply destructive of the 
mainstream. To be sure Shackle did not aim to provide an additional normative theory 
alternative to the probability approach. He aimed to replace the expected utility model by a 
new model motivated on descriptive grounds. But he insisted that his theory could, in 
principle, be axiomatised and, as a result, constitute a viable formalised alternative to the 
mainstream.
24 Potential surprise was Shackle’s replacement for probability, designed to make 
room, on formal, analytically consistent ground for what he called a residual hypothesis. The 
role of the residual hypothesis was to make sure that a proper theory of decision-making did 
consider, unlike the situations assumed to hold under probability calculus, that “the universe 
of discourse is not know” (Ford 1993: 694). 
Shackle insisted that, in order to clarify the influence of potential uniqueness of many 
important decisions, a better appreciation of the epistemic states of the individual was needed. 
For Shackle, a descriptively relevant theory of decision making required explicit recognition 
of personal mental activities, like imagination and the accommodation of potentially unknown 
events. In order to do so he marked the difference of his theory from the use of probability. 
But Shackle did not object to the mainstream, he insisted that an alternative non-probabilistic 
set up could be provided. 
Shackle was the only one among the dissenting decision theorists, in the early 1950s, 
and the dissenting Keynesians, later, who after discussing the limits of probability calculus 
consistently pursued the aim of providing a non-probabilistic decision theory. For instance, 
the argument that, in order to apply probability theory, one must assume replicability of an 
experiment under the same conditions was restated by the Keynesians authors arguing against 
the rational expectations revolution.
25 Moreover, the Austrians have emphasised the strict 
                                                 
23   For sure, we do not intend to refer to utopia neither in the conventional More’s understanding 
of “a place which do not exit,” nor in the more common-place meaning of “a place to be desired.” We 
intend to use the much more restrictive meaning which attributes to the adjective utopian the 
connotation of unattainability or implausibility. 
24    Indeed, Shackle’s inability to comprehend the difference between von Neumann and 
Morgenstern and Savage’s subjective approach may find origin in the fact that, from a descriptive 
point of view, the two theories are alike. 
25   See Davidson (1983), where Shackle’s theory is quoted in support of the applicability of a 
Keynesian theory of probability.   26
relation between Lachmann and Shackle in regarding the future as undetermined, and choice 
as the result of a process of imagination creating a definitive cut between past and future 
(Vaughn 1994). But no follower of Shackle have been able to propose a formalised 
alternative, and this is why he still remains the outstanding dissenting Keynesian to refer to. 
The history of modern decision theory, from the 1950s up until the late 1980s and the 
development of the non-additive approach of Gilboa and Schmeidler, was plenty of 
alternative theoretical models designed to explain choice in situations of less than complete 
knowledge. But for long these theories have been based upon the fundamental assumption of 
a single, additive probability function. Shackle’s aim to pursue a non-probabilistic approach 
by abandoning this fundamental assumption proved to be utopian in the face of the 






Given our viewpoint, the symposium “Decision under uncertainty,” published in 1961 in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, can be considered as a watershed in the development of 
modern decision theory. Here, on the basis of observed violations, Ellsberg and Fellner 
questioned Savage’s subjective probability, while Raiffa argued in its favour. Ellsberg (1961) 
criticised Savage on the grounds that vagueness about probabilities could lead individuals to 
violate the axioms of consistent behaviour upon which Bayesian decision theory was based. 
Savage’s sure thing principle, in particular, was shown to be violated by individuals acting in 
what Ellsberg called “ambiguous” environments. Ellsberg suggested that, even from a 
normative point of view, it could be more appropriate to apply a decision rule combining 
Savage’s rule, to be applied in non-ambiguous situation, with Wald’s rule, to be applied in 
situation of maximum ambiguity. Ellsberg’s (1961, p. 646) suggestion is worth quoting at 
length: “I propose to indicate a class of choice-situations in which many otherwise reasonable 
people neither wish nor tend to conform to the Savage postulates, nor to the other axiom sets 
that have been devised. … We might hope that it is precisely in such circumstances that 
certain proposals for alternative decision rules and non-probabilistic descriptions of 
uncertainty (e.g. by Knight, Shackle, Hurwicz and Hodges and Lehmann) might prove 
fruitful. I believe, in fact, that this is the case.”  As Ellsberg (1961: 661-664) observed from 
the beginning, the rationale under such a decision rule was that in certain situation the use of   27
mathematical expectations seems difficult to understand and new criteria are worth 
analysing.
26 
Raiffa reaffirmed his faith in Savage’s axioms as normative guides. In referring to 
experimental sessions he conducted using adaptations of Ellsberg’s example, Raiffa stated: 
“But if certain uncertainties in the problem were in a cloudy or fuzzy form, then very often 
there was a shifting of gears and no effort at all was made to think deliberately and 
reflectively about the problem. … In reporting this I am just confirming the experience of 
Ellsberg and Fellner (and also of Shackle, Knight, etc.). However, I draw a different message 
from this experience. There is a need to teach people how to cope with uncertainty in a 
purposive and reflective manner, and to break down the taboo that probabilities should only 
be assigned if one has clear cut relative frequency data at hand.” Raiffa reported that 
experimental subjects who were initially inclined to violate the axioms behaved consistently 
with the axioms when made aware of randomisation over possibilities.  
Fellner made the following point. He argued that the observable decision weights that 
an individual attaches to prospective events (namely, “the weights attached to an event if the 
individual bets on the event”) may differ from the true probability, or degree of belief, which 
she would attach to an event if she regards some of her degrees of belief as “shaky 
judgements.” The directly observable decision weights, Fellner maintained, can in many cases 
be derived from subjective probabilities by means of a process of distortion, which he called 
“slanting of probabilities.” The extent of this distortion depends on both the perceived 
instability of certain types of probability judgements and the magnitude of the prize at stake. 
Fellner termed his view a semi-probabilistic one, and discussed at length the subtle question 
of whether the phenomenon of non-additivity was compatible with the notion of rationality. 
He maintained that when events are unique, that is, when they do not belong to any standard 
process with objective characteristics, “we should not regard it as irrational if a person 
develops a reaction to uncertainty rather than is guided exclusively by mathematical 
expectations; and reactions to uncertainty, expressing themselves in slanting tendencies, are 
likely to be stronger for a good many non-standard processes than for the standard processes” 
(Fellner 1961, p. 685). 
                                                 
26   In his doctoral thesis, Ellsberg (2001, pp. 16-17) added: “when ambiguity is extreme, by any 
of his indices: relevant information sparse, or obviously unreliable and contradictory; wide differences 
in the expressed expectations of different individuals; low confidence in available estimates,” the 
“somber reflections” expressed by Shackle “seem too ominously relevant to the very circumstances 
upon which this study focuses to be dismissed.”   28
After Edwards’s early reports on experimental trials (Edwards 1954 and 1958), other 
violations of the Ellsberg’s type were reported in consistent experimental settings and were 
definitely brought to the fore by the summary results of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). On 
the basis of the experimental evidence, Kahneman and Tversky put forward prospect theory 
as a model for decision under risk; their goal was to permit descriptive deviations from 
Savage’s rationality and to achieve theoretical tractability. They attempted to apply distorted 
decision weights as a basis for probabilistic reasoning, using a non linear transformation of 
the probability scale that overweighs small probabilities and underweighs high probabilities. 
Afterwards they applied the transformation to the cumulative distribution of the probability 
scale, and the theory proved to be applicable to uncertain prospects as well (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992). But then it emerged that prospect theory is nothing but a special case of 
non-additive probability, a case commented on in the previous sections (Tversky and Wakker 
1995). 
The discussion originated by Ellsberg’s 1961 paper is a crucial episode in our story. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the symposium constitutes a point of no return as regards 
Shackle’s contribution to the debate on decision theory. In the same 1961 Shackle published 
the final and most complete version of his theory, explicitly intended as the non-probabilistic 
alternative to the probabilistic approach. As seen in the previous section, the themes of the 
QJE symposium were hinted at both in Niehans and in Weckstein’s Metroeconomica papers. 
Shackle discussed these papers at length in the 1961 volume, but we were not able to find any 
evidence that he acknowledged the possible relevance of new theories of uncertainty. Shackle 
continued for long to defend his own theory, even on analytical grounds, but the people he 
talked to and discussed with were no longer well-known decision theorists, either supporters 
or critics of Savage’s approach. Although he was still quoted by both Ellsberg and Raiffa in 
1961, and referred to by Fellner (1965), Shackle’s inability to follow the debate over 
violations of Savage’s framework made him extraneous to subsequent analytical progress. 
Our reconstruction of the period of maximum influence of Shackle’s ideas, which 
ranges from 1949 to 1961, have tried to show that commentators sympathetic towards 
Shackle’s search for a new foundation of decision theory highlighted a number of points of 
major interests. But Shackle did not try to apply it, on the grounds that they were based on 
probability theory. He continued to pursue his own utopian project of providing a non-
probabilistic account of decision under uncertainty. Shackle’s denial to concede to Savage’s 
representation the status of a theory of decision apt to deal with singular acts made him alien 
both to the development of the new mainstream and, what is more relevant, to the discussion   29
on the alternatives to subjective expected utility. This is mostly unfortunate because as we 
reported in the previous sections there is ample evidence that most of his insights are at the 
basis of current developments of decision theory. Had Shackle been able to completely 
understand the comments and appropriately develop the suggestions he received, his theory 
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